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ABSTRACT: I introduce two important case studies of media roles in public debate over the nature of economics 
as a science. These cases, one during the 1890s and the other in the 1940s, reveal uncertainty among the American 
citizenry concerning what kind of science economics is. The question—a long-running one—was this: How pure 
and detached from policy advocacy must economists be? 
1. INTRODUCTION 
During 1894 and 1895, at a time of U.S. economic depression and industrial unrest, an event 
known as the “Bemis Affair” unfolded at the University of Chicago, a grand private institution. 
In 1892, in the school’s first year in existence, the president of the university hired Edward W. 
Bemis, a well-regarded teacher and researcher, as the school’s first tenure-track extension 
economist. Bemis came from Vanderbilt University, where he was known for holding anti-
capitalist leanings. Bemis taught and published a kind of economics known as “historical” 
economics, which differed from a mainstream emphasis on abstract, ahistorical theory. He had 
engaged in dialogue with the university about whether to accept school’s job offer, which he 
did, only after feeling reassured that it was understood that his approach to economics differed 
markedly from economic views held by the chair of the school’s department of political 
economy, J. Laurence Laughlin, as well as the school’s founder, John D. Rockefeller. 
 Bemis’s dismissal from Chicago, three years later, received much news attention. The 
university, without firm supporting evidence, said that Bemis needed to be fired for 
incompetence—that he simply did not teach well. The media, without firm supporting 
evidence, argued that Bemis was fired for his economic views, as disapproved of by Laughlin 
and Rockefeller. 
 Understanding the Bemis affair requires multiple levels of analysis. One factor for 
analysis stems from pressures within a new university attempting to achieve rapid ascent to a 
highest echelon. Another relevant factor occurred at the level of an economics profession 
working its way through intellectual disagreements between “pure” methods and “reform” 
activities for social scientists. A third factor involved uncertainties about Rockefeller as the 
school’s funding source, and how the school’s president, William Rainey Harper, might 
perceive Bemis’s impact on Rockefeller’s willingness to donate funds. 
 Let’s begin with Bemis’s hiring. He came to Chicago recognized as a teacher and a 
scholar. His published works were solid, and those who knew them could recognize Bemis as a 
kind of economist who dealt with real-world facts so as to understand complex problems and 
potential policies for fixing runaway capitalism. Bemis’s publications focused on monopolies, 
especially so-called “gas trusts.” He was trained by economists in a reformist tradition, which 
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believed that meaningful social science must willingly recommend policies. But such a 
willingness to recommend policies could cause troubles for a social scientist at a time when 
many social scientists sought to achieve a more “scientific” status for their profession. 
 When considering the Bemis affair from a point of view of citizens’ engagement with 
science, we can identify a variety of public attempts to understand how social science works 
and how it might relate to policy making. Yet when they paid attention to the Bemis affair, the 
public often simply reduced it to a single question: was academic freedom violated when 
Bemis was fired, or did a financial supporter of a university have a right for some specific 
economic viewpoint to be supported by the school? 
 Historians have studied the Bemis affair and agree that Bemis’s first ‘infraction’ was 
(supposedly) clear by the end of his first year at the school: it was his expressed critical stance 
toward Chicago’s “gas trust.” At some point, gas industry complaints against Bemis began 
arriving at the school. 
 Bemis’s job expectations were a bit different from most professors at Chicago, in that 
he was hired as an extension economist—what the school called an “outside” faculty. He was 
to teach real-world economic issues to the public (issues such as high gas prices in Chicago, or 
labor discontent in Pullman, IL!), and it was of the very nature of extension lecturing that his 
instruction was to minimally employ abstract, rigorous theory. 
 In our search for any sort of more specific infraction that might have been asserted 
against Bemis, one possibility is that local donor money potentially was becoming withheld 
from the school until the school did something about Bemis. Another possibility could be that 
Chicago’s gas companies decided to withhold any favorable rates from the university until the 
school dismissed Bemis. Also possible is that Rockefeller personally withheld financial 
support until the occasion of Bemis’s dismissal. There has been some discussion amongst 
historians of all these possibilities—however there is no known traceable record of any of 
them. 
 On January 15, 1894, fifteen months after Bemis started at Chicago, President 
William Rainey Harper informed Bemis that he would not be reappointed. Bemis did not see 
this coming. His quality teaching and research had attained for him a tenured status at 
Vanderbilt, and he had brought this status with him to Chicago. Bemis was even informed by 
Harper in the summer of 1892 that he was wanted specifically because his economic thought 
was so different from Laughlin’s. Bemis is also on record as drawing respectable attendance 
numbers for his extension lectures—even though the university would, in time, claim 
otherwise. Bemis simply did not see the dismissal letter coming. 
 Yet Harper’s letter could not actually announce a dismissal; he could only request a 
resignation. He offered that if Bemis did just this, then there should be no great difficulty in 
finding him another fine job somewhere, indeed with Harper’s support. Bemis decided not to 
resign. 
 The burden thus fell upon the university to create pressures enough to obtain Bemis’s 
resignation, or if not successful with that, to identify a basis for firing a tenured professor. The 
new situation began with months passing and nothing obvious happening. But this was only 
how things seemed. Both sides actually moved quietly forward in accordance with their 
opposed beliefs about what seemed possible with respect to the idea of firing Bemis. For 
Bemis, he expected that his tenured status coupled with successful meeting of job requirements 
ought to mean job security. As to the university, for some reason they wanted Bemis gone. 
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 For awhile each side backed away from each other, with each side instead 
communicating with persons outside the school. Harper occasionally shared thoughts in 
correspondence with friends, including with a least two persons from the press. Bemis shared 
his concerns with economist friends, most notably Richard Ely at Wisconsin and H.C. Adams 
at Johns Hopkins. 
 There are various methods for piecing together a history of the Bemis affair, 
extending from the requested resignation (Jan. 1894) to his resignation and departure (Oct. 
1895). One method focuses on archives, where various bits of useful information exist. A 
history of the Bemis affair can also be traced in the media—which is our particular approach 
herein. 
2. THE BEMIS AFFAIR AS TOLD BY THE MEDIA 
On June 30, 1894, about half a year after Harper’s private request for Bemis’s resignation, the 
Chicago Tribune announced that Bemis planned to leave the school upon completion of his 
contract for 1894–95. The writer for the Tribune tended to distrust Rockefeller and emphasized 
that Bemis’s approach to economics was simply unwanted at Chicago.  
For two years Prof. Bemis has suffered the embarrassment and disadvantage of being at swords’ 
points with Head Professor J. Laurence Laughlin of the economic[s] department. That a breach 
would eventually ensure there was little doubt. Indeed, the differences of opinion which separated 
Profs. Laughlin and Bemis were so decided that the former refused to recognize the latter on the 
streets.” 
The article saw the issue as a disagreement about which kind of economics was true science— 
Laughlin’s general theorizing or Bemis’s case studies, such as trade unionism, factory 
legislation, and the like. The writer added how it “has frequently been told that Prof. Laughlin 
openly advised students in economics not to take Bemis’ courses if they desired to do scientific 
work.” 
 This paper—the Chicago Tribune—continued with the story over time, as did the 
Chicago Daily News, doing so with at least five articles by August 7 of the following year. In 
the Daily News on Aug. 7, 1895, for example, it was written how “it is generally conceded that 
the professor’s study of economics is not prolific of agreeable results to the ‘authorities’ at Mr. 
Rockefeller’s fane of learning.” 
 Many other news outlets covered the story by the summer of 1895—owing to the fact 
that Bemis was still not making it clear that he was willing to go. In New York, the new home 
city of Rockefeller (who moved there from Cleveland), The World covered it (August 14), as 
did The Voice (August 17). The New York Evening Post (August 12) strongly impugned 
Rockefeller:  
Any suggestion that capital in the form of a university is oppressing labor in the person of a 
professor is capable of indefinite expansion. It happens that Mr. John D. Rockefeller has given a 
large sum of money to this university, and the conclusion is obvious that the Standard Oil Company 
has built up an institution of learning to promote its own theories of political economy. 
In Great Britain, the Bath Times (August 8) covered the story, with its writer arguing that 
maybe different kinds of truths are attainable in social science, when compared to truths 
attained by other sciences. Also offered was that  
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[t]he removal of Prof. Bemis, of the Chicago University, for teaching his students the truth in 
political economy is not surprising. Every institution of learning dependent for its existence on the 
bounty of millionaire monopolists is in constant liability to similar calamities. It is quite natural that 
Mr. Rockefeller should not relish having a teacher, paid with his money, expose the essentially 
unjust and iniquitous way in which that money was obtained. 
 Looking westward from Chicago, the San Francisco Bulletin (August 19) suggested, 
at length, that Rockefeller must not like Bemis: 
It is known that during his residence in Chicago Mr. Bemis has been active in his opposition to 
monopolies. One particular object of his hostility was the Chicago Gas Company, a corporation 
which makes gas at 6 cents a thousand feet and sells it at $1.10. The Chicago Gas Company’s stock 
was known to be inflated, and it was also known that enormous dividends were paid on this inflated 
capital. Professor Bemis thought that some method should be devised by which the profits of 
making gas should be distributed among the people . . . The inference is that Mr. Rockefeller did 
not approve of the position Professor Bemis took and tenaciously held. 
The University of Chicago, on August 20th, released a statement expressing that any matter 
between the university and Bemis had nothing to do with Rockefeller. And also it should be 
known, according to the statement, that the university does not violate academic freedom. 
 The Boston Herald (August 22) figured that Bemis was discharged at the “instigation” 
of Rockefeller.  
In all the letters sent out from this institution the heading reads that Mr. John D. Rockefeller is the 
founder, and it is impossible at the present knowledge to avoid the inference that Prof. Bemis has 
been discharged at his instigation. 
 The Philadelphia Inquirer (August 26) suggested that Bemis’s “scalp now dangles at the 
breast of monopoly,” but that this was fine somehow, in that Rockefeller’s money had left their 
state—and so it was “just as well after all that the Standard Oil Money made in Pennsylvania 
went to no Pennsylvania College.” 
 The Ft. Worth Gazette (August 31) —in the midst of the great 1895 Texas oil rush—
saw Bemis as the scientific one. “The institution was chiefly endowed by John D. Rockafeller 
(sic), assisted by Charles T. Yerkes—the Standard Oil magnate of the continent, and the street 
railway potentate of Chicago,” the writer observed, and then added that Bemis’s “conclusions 
as to the danger from natural monopolies passing into private control are derived from 
scientific and historic study….He treats the matter as a college professor should treat it.” The 
Montreal Witness (September 3), citing also an article in the New York Recorder, opined that 
Rockefeller should be able to have his views supported by social science:  
Mr. Rockefeller and his associates have a perfect right to employ professors and pay them roundly 
for teaching the Rockefeller views of political economy, and if they do not get the views they pay 
for they have also a clear right to stop the teaching and discharge the teacher. 
In September 1895, University of Chicago sociologist Albion Small used the school’s 
American Journal of Sociology to critically comment in a way evidently designed to clamp 
down on anyone who might again express support for Bemis. Small reprinted a letter, 
supposedly typical of many letters, which he described as flawed in its logic for supporting 
Bemis. Small described the reprinted letter as an attempt to describe  
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an educational institution founded by the arch-robber of America and which already, by its 
treatment of Professor Bemis, exhibits a determination to throttle free investigation of sociological 
or economic subjects wherever there is any danger of running counter to plutocratic interests. 
Small then proceeded to destroy such a view.1 
 But more media coverage came. In October, The Voice (NYC) aligned itself with 
Bemis, who was respected for his efforts which have “contributed more than the efforts of any 
other individual to the municipalization of gas and cognate commodities in this country.” The 
Chicago Daily Tribune (October 3) doubted the university, primarily because of its continued 
silence. The Chicago Daily News (October 9) published Bemis’s belief that bad word about 
him must have been leaked by the university. Bemis challenged Harper to explain what he 
meant in his original letter back on January 15, 1894, when he allowed that “peculiar 
circumstances” existed at Chicago which, evidently, would make it tough for Bemis to remain 
there. The Chicago Daily Tribune (October 10) wondered if there was solid reason for the 
university’s firing of Bemis, while The Kingdom (Minneapolis) (October 11) supported Bemis 
yet wondered the same thing. The Kingdom asked what kind of social science the university 
might allow. 
 News outlets soon had new material to consider, when the university released its press 
statement explaining why Bemis was being let go: not because of any specific expressed 
viewpoint, but because of his supposedly poor teaching; he was dismissed for “incompetence.” 
The university’s press release, including a statement from President Harper, was published in 
the Chicago Record (October 18), and then in that evening’s Chicago Daily News. 
 The Chicago Daily Tribune the next day introduced Bemis’s words in his defense, 
including his belief that his economics is good science. Bemis cited an opinion previously 
shared by Small, to the effect that Bemis is  
the best man in the country to write books on many of the following: immigration, population, 
cooperation, profit-sharing, building & loan associations, life insurance, labor organization, 
arbitration, factory and other labor legislation but those subjects were too specialized for university 
instruction. 
Even after he no longer worked for the school (as of October 1, 1895), Bemis strengthened his 
counterpoint, as was published in the likes of the Boston Transcript (October 29). Also 
critically exploring the matter was a piece in City and State, edited by Herbert Welsh, an 
important, Philadelphia-based political reformer. Welsh editorialized about the gist of the 
university’s public statement “that”—in Welsh’s summarizing words—“Professor Bemis was 
not much of a teacher any way.”  
                                                
1  Small argued that a capitalist economy is substantially more complex than the writer imagines, as it is in fact 
“possible to serve the cause of justice and to promote the common weal without begging social questions, and 
without joining in vulgar denunciations of social factors which after all may prove to be social blessings.” 
Small explained his concern at least to “oppose to the assumption that industrial combination is robbery, the 
counter assumption that industrial combination is progress.” Neutral science is what is needed to determine 
which assumption is the more correct of the two, and doubtless “the final truth” will, upon pure and 
undetached scientific arbitration, be found to “lie somewhere between these two extremes.” Persons inside the 
university needed to be trusted in these affairs, as not only are they “the only persons who know the facts,” but 
more importantly, they “have repeatedly assured representatives of the press that nothing in the case is of any 
public interest to the public, because no principle in which the public is concerned is in any way involved.” 
This, Small explained, should put the whole matter to rest. 
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It is known in private circles that a feud has long existed in the university between some of these 
professors and Professor Bemis. If incompetency on the part of the latter was the real difficulty, it is 
strange that the public has not heard of that very much, if at all, until just now. 
An opinion piece came the next month in the journal Social Economist, which declared that 
“The University of Chicago is a private, not a socialistic, institution.” The article added a 
question quoted from the New York Times: “Why should an institution pay a professor to teach 
social doctrines which are contrary to the consensus of opinions of the faculty, the supporters 
of the institution, and of the general community?” The writer of the piece believed there was 
no reason for any public explanation from the University of Chicago. In his seeing capitalism 
and socialism as competing systems of faith, so incompatible with each other as to preclude 
their coexistence, the writer—George Gunton—added his analogy:  
There is no more reason why those who believe in the present industrial institutions should be 
surreptitiously made to support teachers of Socialism than there is that Catholics should employ 
Protestants as priests or Jews install Christians to preside in their synagogues. 
As to Bemis, within about a year of his departure from Chicago he was hired by a public land-
grant school, Kansas State Agricultural College. 
3. SAME STORY, DIFFERENT SETTING 
A half century later, during 1943 and 1944, economists, college administrators and citizens of 
Iowa waged a battle over the purposes of social science. Iowa’s debate was a frontline event in 
a struggle to establish safeguards allowing policy research at public educational institutions. In 
a conflict over a proposed policy to temporarily produce less butter, one side declared that 
economists at land-grant Iowa State College must limit themselves to advocating policies 
directly supporting Iowa interests, while an opposing group advocated policy research to win 
the war. What eventually happened was that financial donors and college administrators 
insisted on social science devoid of policy arguments. However, Iowa State’s social scientists 
wanted what they believed was a more realistic standard. The debate resulted in an unresolved 
conflict over the potentials and limitations for policy-oriented social science. 
 The controversy at Iowa State began with a policy proposal from the school’s 
economics department that more consumption of margarine would help make more milk 
products available for soldiers. Iowa interest groups promptly objected to such a policy 
recommendation. Much bad press then ensued with respect to how Iowans felt about their 
economists at Iowa State. In the end, there were numerous resignations by these economists. 
We can look back and interpret the controversy as a test case for the validity of allowing social 
scientists at public institutions to advocate public policy. 
 Much that happened during Iowa State’s butter-margarine war was because there was 
a strong leader in the school’s economics department, namely, Theodore W. Schultz. By the 
1940s, Schultz held views well-known within the profession, and also often introduced into 
public discussion—certainly, at least, in the state of Iowa. 
 With the coming of U.S. involvement in the Second World War, a request came to 
Iowa State, in October 1942, from the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The USDA asked Iowa 
State to create a more efficient food policy to help win the war. In agreement with the USDA, 
Iowa State expressed willingness to do so, and they requested a grant from the Rockefeller 
Foundation to support production of about a dozen pamphlets on national food policy. In the 
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request for the grant, Schultz stated the pressing importance of “a study of governmental 
policies affecting production and distribution of food.” He assured the foundation that the 
project was cleared with Iowa State President Charles E. Friley, and was encouraged by the 
USDA’s “urgent” belief in “the need for critical appraisals made by persons outside of 
government, evaluations which will point out the merits and limitations of current policies and 
programs.” Friley and others at Iowa State provided letters of support. 
 The Rockefeller Foundation itself stated an expectation to see “recommendations as to 
food production, distribution and consumption policies.” Iowa State’s economists produced 
outlines for fifteen pamphlets, and by the end of March, four pamphlets were in print. It was 
so-called “Pamphlet No. 5,” published the first week of April, 1943, that brought trouble. The 
pamphlet was produced by economics graduate student Oswald H. Brownlee, and was titled 
“Putting Dairying on a War Footing.” The chief goal of all policy recommendations in the 
pamphlet was to make more milk products available to soldiers. Brownlee recommended that 
American households use more margarine instead of butter. 
 Iowa’s dairy industry responded severely to Brownlee’s recommendation. Industry 
representatives said that as Iowa taxpayers, they had been betrayed. Any policies that were to 
come from an institution so heavily supported by Iowa’s taxpayers should favor Iowans; 
citizens of Iowa saw the school as their personal advocate. Publication outlets for such views 
included the Dairy Record (St. Paul, MN), the Creamery Journal (Waterloo, IA), and 
especially the major newspaper in the state, the Des Moines Register. In at least one case an 
early news item opined about the quality of science coming from an Iowa social scientist who 
would attempt to help formulate public policy; this was the Dairy Record (April 28), which 
stated that the economist authoring the pamphlet was a “sadistic” person who 
 has a false notion that he pursues a calling that is, of itself, a science. The very fact that the 
author…fails to take cognizance of the economic importance of the butter industry to the state he is 
supposed to serve seems to indicate that, in his search for the profound, he has forgotten the 
simplest definition of his vocation. 
The author, like all economists, must be an “unstable” person troubled by an “inferiority 
complex,” who during college days was “unwilling or unable to provide the concentration 
needed to master the exact sciences.” 
 Media coverage of the controversy was severe, and by May 19, a decision was made 
to retract “Pamphlet No. 5.” The media covered the meeting whereupon this decision was 
made, as well as covered the school’s announced plans to critically study contents of the 
pamphlet to identify and remove all that was not scientifically certain in the pamphlet. Dairy 
interests communicated their view of the relationship between social science, public policy, 
and the public—with an example being Francis Johnson, president of the Iowa Farm Bureau 
Federation. Johnson made it into the news for drawing attention to farming interests “alarmed 
over the apparent tendency to make over Iowa State College into a tax-supported blueprint of 
Harvard University.” Iowa State is different from Harvard by not being a “free-lance” 
institution, and the school has no right to risk making “impractical suggestions or 
recommendations” on policy matters. “The true test of the value of most research on matters of 
public policy,” Johnson pronounced, “is determined by the eventual acceptance and use of the 
recommendations. The college cannot justify its existence on the basis on mere ‘irrational 
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value.’” A central question in this 1940s debate was clear: what kinds of policy research by 
social scientists would be allowed at a taxpayer-supported school?2 
 The press regularly took time to report on the story. Newspapers debated whether 
Iowa’s social scientists should be permitted to make policy arguments. An editorial in the Des 
Moines Register framed some of the issues. In expressing “devotion to ‘the scientific 
approach’” to social research, the Register opined that “as a democratic people we are trying to 
thrash the thing out, in the light of all the facts and interpretations that we can get, so as to 
arrive eventually at the right answer.” Yet the editorial added that “the issue is not one of the 
right and duty of professors to try to serve the public interest.” Many continuing letters and 
editorials revealed complex thinking on both sides of the issue. 
 Media coverage of Iowa’s citizen-based debate about the purpose of social science at 
a taxpayer-supported institution turned rough. The Register published excerpts from Pamphlet 
No. 5, to which dairy interests responded with a full-page advertisement nationally sponsored 
by the American Dairy Association (ADA). The ad accused Iowa State’s economists of 
proposing “that the housewives of America be denied butter and be forced to accept a product 
they have refused on its own merits.” The ADA depicted Iowa State as subverting the war 
effort by “taking a stand against the Government’s Wartime Food Production Program.” The 
group claimed that no fewer than “five million dairy farmers are shocked at the rumpus created 
by the much-discussed Pamphlet No. 5,” which “rocks the very foundation of diversified 
farming” and “challenges the dairy farmer’s way of life.” Iowa dairy representatives, following 
in the slipstream of the ADA’s advertisement, passed a resolution declaring that the pamphlet 
“jeopardizes the national war food program,” and “has done untold injury to a basic industry 
which means an annual income to the state of more than 100 million dollars per year.” 
 Reports by two committees came in July. First to report was the Joint Committee, 
which got their views into the press. There was also a Special Committee that reported only to 
Friley, and any of their actual findings stayed out of the press. The Joint Committee’s meeting 
on July 12 gained heavy press coverage reporting an agreement by all committee members that 
so many elements in the pamphlet were incorrect, or at least misinterpreted, that the pamphlet 
required retraction. 
 The Iowa press extensively covered the story. Iowans also wrote letters to Iowa State, 
mostly accusing the school of capitulating to special interests. Even the national press took an 
interest in the controversy, at a time when Americans had bigger worries on their minds. In the 
midst of war coverage, Time Magazine published a brief article titled “The Butter Atheist,” 
while Newsweek facetiously reported that Iowa’s dairy leaders had “found a traitor in their 
ranks”—the traitor being Iowa State College, “for years tax-supported by the farmers.” Even 
the Chicago Journal of Commerce expressed disbelief that President Friley and the Iowa State 
administration were trying to “bamboozle” the public with “puerile actions” that have “cast 
suspicion on all future publications coming from faculty members” at Iowa State. As seen 
through the eyes of the nation’s business leaders, the problem was clear:  
                                                
2  Another view was expressed by Schultz, on multiple occasions. For example, during a meeting with Friley, 
Schultz pondered whether a professor at Iowa State can, if under an arrangement to serve some industry’s own 
interests, “stay wholly impartial, unbiased and objective?” Schultz (although referencing an example of a 
professor writing advertisement language to support a cattle breed association) asked Friley: “Will not other 
special interest groups, seeing arrangements of this type, quite properly come to expect similar personal 
services on their behalf?” Schultz believed that any such ties to special interests necessarily will lead to a loss 
of public confidence in research findings. 
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If the pressure groups like the dairymen in Iowa get research conclusions revised merely by putting 
the squeeze on the college president and threatening to have the legislature cut the college’s 
appropriations, why should anyone believe that any of the college’s future research publications are 
impartial and not written with an eye to catering to the prejudices of the producers around the state? 
Leadership at Iowa State moved to begin the revision process—a protracted effort that would 
witness the cancellation of other planned pamphlets, a reorganization of the editorial board of 
Iowa State’s college press that oversaw publication of the pamphlets, the creation of a 
“Committee to Reorganize the Department of Economics and Sociology,” creation of a 
“Committee on Sponsorship of Publications,” multiple resignations from the President’s 
Special Committee (and also a heart-exhaustion related death of a committee member), public 
statements by the governor of the state, and the beginnings of national-level investigations by 
the ACLU and other groups. 
 Media coverage especially attended to Schultz’s resignation from the land-grant 
school, on September 15, 1943f—or a job at the University of Chicago. And, when no revised 
pamphlet was forthcoming by October, news outlets began questioning what kind of science 
social science is? 
 Wallaces’ Farmer (Des Moines) recognized not only Schultz’s resignation as a “great 
loss” for Iowa State as well as “in the larger field of public affairs,” but tried to find the central 
issue in the controversy: it was what kind of social science would be allowed at Iowa State. To 
be useful, economists “must deal with pressing and controversial issues.” Iowa State’s 
economists are expected to be as impartial as possible, and to present facts as they see them. 
“But so long as it bases its conclusions on the best evidence it can find, nobody should object, 
altho some may squirm and altho others may—quite properly—ask for further investigation 
into the facts.” The editorial added,  
You can’t cure cancer by telling the doctor you don’t believe in it, and that he is to find another 
diagnosis. So, in economic diseases, we need to let the economists do the best they can without any 
orders as to what the diagnosis should be. 
Another news commentary suggested that the central issue that  
must be taken into account…is that the social sciences are not precise sciences. On many questions 
it is possible for another person in the field to take a different—even an opposite—position from 
Doctor Schultz and still be considered as competent an economist as he.  
In the Des Moines Register, a particularly vocal supporter of Schultz, one Thomas Keenan, 
offered historical comparison: 
When Copernicus reported his conclusion that the sun did not revolve around the earth but that the 
earth revolved around the sun, there was plenty of ‘studied judgment by qualified authorities’ to the 
effect that he was a heretic. If he had been on the faculty at [Iowa State] I.S.C. would the college 
have refused to assist in publicizing that report? When Harvey reported that the blood in our bodies 
circulated through the veins and arteries there was plenty of ‘studied judgment by qualified 
authorities’ to the effect that he was crazy; so we would have turned thumbs down on him and he 
would have gone to the University of Chicago. 
Time Magazine (October 11, 1943) reported that an Iowa State graduate student produced a 
“disinterested oleopus,” but the Iowa Farm Bureau declared it foul. Such a pamphlet “might 
befit scholarly Harvard,” the article reported the Farm Bureau crying, “but was disloyal in a 
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cow college.” According to Reader’s Digest, Brownlee had published an informative and 
balanced collection of facts only to discover that “there was the very devil to pay.” Dairy 
interests “demanded Brownlee’s scalp”; Schultz then “chucked his job and escaped to 
Chicago,” while President Friley “placated the dairy interests by disowning the heretical tract.” 
Harper’s Magazine reported that margarine, suddenly charged with “the power of dynamite,” 
had ignited an explosion that has “blown up the works at Iowa State College of Agriculture— 
through the suppression of a pamphlet enumerating the virtues of margarine during the 
wartime butter shortage.” 
 Temporary relief came with the arrival of the holiday season, which in a college 
environment can slow down the pace of meetings, at least just a bit. But by late January, with 
no revision of Pamphlet No. 5 forthcoming, some real possibility existed that investigators 
might visit Ames on behalf of the ACLU or other groups. The possibility of investigation by 
the ACLU, in particular, was announced to a national readership in an article in The New 
Republic. J.M. O’Neill, who chaired the ACLU’s Committee on Academic Freedom, identified 
the Iowa case as concerning “the freedom to speak, to teach, to publish the truth as he sees it 
on the part of the teacher and research scholar.” President Friley, O’Neill charged, had “given 
up without a fight the fortress for truth and the public interest.” 
 Approval of revised Pamphlet No. 5 came on March 16, 1944. Iowa State released a 
publicity notice the following day, and the revised pamphlet was printed and mailed on May 2, 
1944. During the time of the controversy or soon thereafter, sixteen of Iowa State’s twenty-six 
economists resigned. 
3. CONCLUSION 
To conclude: I believe these two cases work together when we seek better understanding of 
public conflict over the place of economic science in society. Do economists only discover 
objective scientific truths that, in turn, political and governmental processes must evaluate for 
any policy implications? Or, do economists themselves have permission to explore—and even 
advocate—particular policy changes in response to their economic analysis? This debate did 
not begin in 1894 and it did not end in 1944. Yet with respect to a history of contention 
between objectivity and advocacy, the two episodes of conflict, while not wholly unique, are 
perhaps as central as they come. 
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